Values Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in northern, western and southern Europe: An update.

Johan Surkyn and Ron Lesthaeghe
Interface Demography, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (jrsurkyn@vub.ac.be ; rlestha@vub.ac.be)

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1 Introduction

Starting in the 1960s, there was a drastic transformation in the pattern of household formation and reproduction in north-western Europe. The age at first marriage rose again after falling to an unprecedented low during the 1960s. Premarital and postmarital cohabitation increased, and procreation in such informal unions soon followed. Divorce rates continued to rise in tandem with high separation rates among cohabitants. Also starting in the late 1960s was a pronounced postponement of fertility, which was followed by only a partial catching up at later ages.[1] In the 1970s, total fertility rates (TFRs) in western countries essentially reflected differential postponement; in the 1990s, national TFRs mainly capture differential degrees of catching up after age 30.[2]

At first it was thought that the economic recession following the 1974 oil crisis was responsible for later marriage and postponement of childbearing,[3] but there were already some suspicions that the roots of the new forms of household formation were to be found in the 1960s, and more particularly in the marked shift in values that occurred during that decade. Demographic changes were linked to (i) the accentuation of individual autonomy in ethical, moral and political spheres; (ii) to the concomitant rejection of all forms of institutional controls and authority; and (iii) to the rise of expressive values connected to the so-called "higher order needs"[4] of self-actualisation. This connection between the demographic and values transformations became an essential ingredient of "Europe's second demographic transition" (SDT).[5]

Towards the end of the 1980s, several features of this "second transition" seemed to stop at the Alps and Pyrenees. Italy, Portugal and Spain had started the postponement phase with respect to marriage and fertility, but the other two features, i.e. cohabitation and procreation outside wedlock, had either failed to gain ground (Italy) or were just beginning to spread (Portugal, Spain). Until 1990, earlier patterns of marriage and fertility had also been maintained in central and eastern Europe. As yet there were no clear signs of postponement or of the diffusion of premarital cohabitation. It thus seemed that the SDT was a

[1] A detailed analysis of these tempo shifts in successive cohorts is given in T. Frejka and G. Calot, "Cohort reproductive patterns in low-fertility countries", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 103-132. See also R. Lesthaeghe, "Postponement and recuperation – recent fertility trends and forecasts in six western European countries", paper presented to the IUSSP Seminar on International Perspectives on Low Fertility, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Tokyo), 21-23 March 2001.

[2] On the repercussions of shifts in cohort fertility patterns on TFRs, see R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, "Recent trends in fertility and household formation in the industrialised west", *Review of Population and Social Policy*, No. 9, 2000, pp. 121-170.

[3] In an initial article on the second demographic transition produced, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa still considered that the tempo shifts in fertility and nuptiality were enhanced by the economic recession of the 1975-1985 decade. Hence they envisaged the possibility of a joint operation of economic and cultural factors. R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa, "Twee demografische transities?", in R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa (eds.), *Groei of Krimp?*, book volume of "Mens en Maatschappij" (Deventer, Van Loghum-Slaterus, 1986), pp. 9-24.

[4] The term was introduced by the psychologist A. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York, Harper and Row, 1954). His "lower order needs" mainly pertain to subsistence needs (not luxury goods!), safety and longer-term material security.

[5] The term first appears in the already cited Dutch language journal, but it spread following van de Kaa's subsequent article. D. van de Kaa, "Europe's second demographic transition", *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1987.

northern and western European phenomenon, which had crossed the oceans (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States) but not the old European cultural and political divides.

After 1990 this picture changed completely. In the Iberian Peninsula, the proportions of births outside marriage rose more rapidly, signalling that both cohabitation and procreation within informal unions were spreading. In central and eastern Europe (but not in the CIS countries), the postponement of marriage and childbearing started and progressed to the point of causing a fall in national TFRs to levels below 1.5 children and even 1.3. A new term was coined: "lowest-low fertility".[6] A direct connection was made between marriage and fertility postponement on the one hand and the effects of the difficult economic transition on the other. In particular, these demographic changes were directly linked to rising unemployment, a reduction in activity rates especially for women, to the end of life-long employment guarantees, the drop in real household incomes, the decline of state support for families and the enhanced visibility of poverty.[7]

It became clear, however, that the economic crisis was not the sole explanation for the demographic changes in central and eastern Europe. In fact, by the 1990s the younger generations which were to marry and start childbearing, had different priorities and aspirations compared with those of the older cohorts who had spent much of their lives during the communist era.[8] As was shown in an earlier contribution, the patterns of values differentiation between people with different types of living arrangements strongly supported the "second demographic transition thesis" for a number of central and eastern European states as well. [9]

The present paper redirects attention to the western European situation. Firstly, it wishes to explore whether the historically leading countries in the SDT, i.e. the Scandinavian ones, still exhibit the typical statistical associations between various values orientations and the different types of household positions during the 1990s. After three decades one could indeed expect that such associations are dampened or even obliterated as a result of routinisation of new forms of demographic behaviour in these early SDT-countries. Secondly, we wish to check whether similar associations are equally emerging among southern European "newcomers", and more specifically in the Iberian Peninsula. As indicated, Portugal and Spain increasingly exhibit the demographic SDT-characteristics since the middle of the 1980s. Thirdly, the latest results for a few western European "classics" are added for comparison. Finally, the update has become possible thanks to the 1999 round of the European Values Surveys (EVS). However, this source is not without problems, as we shall show in the next section.

2 The European Values Surveys of 1999

Since 1980 the European Values Surveys (EVS) have become a major source of information on changing values and their covariates.[10] There have now been three rounds of the EVS (1981, 1990, 1999) in a fairly large number of countries. Attitude and values measurements cover a broad variety of domains: marriage and family, gender, religion, civil morality and ethics, political preferences, trust in institutions,

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[6] H.-P. Kohler, F. Billari and J. Ortega, "Towards a theory of lowest-low fertility", paper presented to the IUSSP General Conference (Salvador, Brazil), 18-24 August 2001.

[7] UNECE, "Fertility decline in the transition economies, 1989-1998: economic and social factors revisited", *Economic Survey of Europe*, *2000 No. 1*, pp. 189-207.

[8] S. Zakharov, *Fertility Trends in Russia and the European New Independent States: Crisis or Turning Point?* (ESA./P/WP.140), United Nations Population Division, Expert Group Meeting on Below-Replacement Fertility (New York), 4-6 November 1997, pp. 271-290; S. Zakharov and E. Ivanova, "Fertility decline and recent changes in Russia: on the threshold of the second demographic transition", in J. Davanzo (ed.), *Russia's Demographic Crisis* (Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1996), pp. 36-82; E. Fratczak, "Declining fertility in Poland during the transition period 1989-1997", paper presented to the Workshop on Lowest-low Fertility, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, (Rostock), 10-11 December 1998; D. Philipov, "Low fertility in central and eastern Europe – culture or economy?", paper presented to the IUSSP seminar on International Perspectives on Low Fertility, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Tokyo), 21-23 March 2001; K. Zeman, T. Sobotka and V. Kantorova, "Halfway between socialist greenhouse and postmodern plurality: life course transitions of young Czech women", paper presented to the Euresco Conference on the Second Demographic Transition (Bad Herrenalb), 23-28 June 2001, session 2B; J. Rychtarikova, "The second demographic transition and the transformation of fertility and partnership in the Czech Republic and other eastern European countries", ibid., session 2A; L. Rabusic, "On marriage and family trends in the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s" (in Czech), *Demografie*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1996, pp. 173-180; L. Rabusic, "Value Change and Demographic Behaviour in the Czech Republic", *Czech Sociological Review*, 2001,9,1:99-122;. T. Sobotka, "Ten years of rapid fertility changes in the European post-communist countries – Evidence and interpretation.", Working Paper 2002-1, Population Research Center, University of Groningen, Groningen, July 2002.

[9] R. Lesthaeghe and J. Surkyn, "New forms of household formation in central and eastern Europe: are they related to newly emerging value orientations?*", UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe,* 2002 No. 1, chapter 6:197-216

[10] For an overview of the indicators and national results, see L. Halman, *The European Values Study – A Third Wave* (Tilburg, WORC Tilburg University, 2001). We would like to acknowledge the permission given by the EVS Consortium for the use of the 1999 data files. Most of the national data sets are now in the public domain and can be obtained from Halman@kub.nl.

the propensity to protest, "postmaterialism",[11] social distance and tolerance for minorities, qualities valued in socialisation and in work, world orientation, economic ideology (free enterprise versus state intervention), community involvement and organisation membership, etc. Most of these topics are covered by multiple questions or items, which improves the validity of their measurement. In the 1999 round, many countries also fine-tuned the household questions, *inter alia*, by inserting a probe for earlier premarital cohabitation. As a consequence, a finer typology for living arrangements could be constructed from this latest round of data.

The major drawback of the EVS has always been the use of small national sample sizes. The EVS standard practice is that a sample of 1,000 respondents suffices to cover the entire population, i.e. both sexes and all ages from 18 to 80. Only a few countries have larger sample sizes.[12] Such small samples are generally inadequate for crucial topics such as the study of the values orientations of the newly arriving cohorts of young adults, or for addressing any questions pertaining to more narrow age groups or subcategories.

The present study has also been hampered by these small national EVS samples, and as a result it was necessary to pool information for countries. For the present purpose, three pooled groups are formed:

- *WEST-3*: Belgium, France and Germany;
- *IBERIA-2*: Portugal and Spain;
- *SCANDINAVIA-2*: Sweden and Denmark.

As already mentioned, the 1999 EVS permits a more meaningful classification of respondents according to household situation than was possible in the earlier EVS rounds. More specifically, use is made of the following eight categories:

- *Respar*: respondents currently residing in the parental household without a partner or spouse. Most of them are never married or were never in a union, and never left home either (86 per cent). The rest have returned to the parental household after a different history;
- *Single*: Respondents who are not living with their parents, have never married and are not currently in a partnership either. Some had an earlier relationship, but none have children;
- *Coh0*: currently unmarried but cohabiting respondents without children, irrespective of earlier histories;
- *Coh+*: currently cohabiting respondents with children, again irrespective of earlier histories;
- *Mar0*: currently married respondents with a spouse present but without children;
- *Mar+N*: currently married respondents with a spouse and children, but who never passed through premarital cohabitation (N = *never* cohabited);
- *Mar+E*: currently married with spouse and children, but who passed through premarital cohabitation (E = *ever* cohabited);
- *FmNu*: formerly married or cohabiting respondents who are currently divorced or separated, but not yet in a new union. The majority of these respondents (80 per cent) have children and many women among them form a lone parent household.

The sample sizes for the eight household types in each of the three groups of countries are given in table 2.1 (absolute numbers and percentage distribution). These pertain to respondents aged 18 to 45. Despite the pooling of national samples, sample sizes are still small for some household categories, and especially for respondents with a current or earlier cohabitation experience in the Iberian peninsula. This

[11] R. Inglehart's term "postmaterialism" has been a constant source of misinterpretation. Inglehart coined the term largely as an expression of Maslow's "higher order needs" in the political sphere (democratic participation, grass-roots democracy, concerns related to environmental quality, freedom of speech, emancipation, new political ideas, etc.). The "materialist" orientation in Inglehart's formulation deals with income security, safeguarding of the social security system, political stability and "law and order". This concept has nothing to do with consumerism or conspicuous consumption of luxury goods. R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1977).

[12] Sample sizes of 2000-2500 are used only in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Russia.

Table 2.1: Sample sizes for household types in 3 country groups (Abs. numbers + %), respondents aged 15-45.

Household position	West-3	Iberia-2	Scandinavia-2	Total
Respar	287 (10,8)	322 (31,1)	45 (5,1)	654 (14,3)
Single	340 (12,8)	49 (4,7)	92 (10,4)	481 (10,5)
Coh0	346 (13,0)	87 (8,4)	189 (21,3)	622 (13,6)
Coh+	198 (7,5)	30 (2,9)	119 (13,4)	347 (7,6)
Mar0	126 (4,8)	76 (7,4)	43 (4,8)	245 (5,4)
Mar+N	649 (24,5)	417 (40,3)	197 (22,2)	1263 (27,6)
Mar+E	511 (19,3)	18 (1,7)	171 (19,3)	700 (15,3)
FmNu	195 (7,4)	35 (3,4)	32 (3,6)	262 (5,7)
Total	2652 (100)	1034 (100)	888 (100)	4574 (100)

obviously reflects their smaller prevalence in the population. Also, few respondents living alone after separation or widowhood were found in Sweden and Denmark, which is indicative of faster re-entry into consensual unions and of a higher non-response in this group. But, for research relating household positions to values orientations these sample sizes are adequate. Aside from the sample size problem, the eight household positions defined above constitute a "maximal resolution" typology of household positions that can be achieved with the EVS questions. In other words, more elaborate typologies that would capture more detailed histories and paths of household position transitions cannot be constructed.

3 Which values matter?

The initial article on "the second demographic transition"[13] posited that the new living arrangements, and cohabitation in particular, were the expression of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better educated young cohorts with an egalitarian world view and greater emphasis on "higher order needs" (i.e. self-actualisation, expressive values, recognition). This reflected the picture of cohabitants in the Low Countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, Belgium and the Netherlands had a plethora of political parties that represented the entire spectrum from "old values" to "new values",[14] and voting behaviour according to living arrangements provided the initial empirical check. At the same time the correlates of Inglehart's "post-materialist" orientation were high on the research agenda of political scientists, and both the European Union Eurobarometer Surveys and the first EVS of 1981 provided data for more detailed empirical verification in several west European countries. Also in the United States statistical associations between values orientations and living arrangements were drawing attention. Moreover, the United States demographers and sociologists had moved on to panel studies in which specific values orientations were recorded at each wave in tandem with the recording of vital events occurring in the intervals between successive waves.[15] As a result, American scholars were able to verify

[13] R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa, "Twee Demografische Transities?", in R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa (eds.), *Groei of Krimp?,* book volume of "Mens en Maatschappij" (Deventer, Van Loghum-Slaterus, 1986). The first broader empirical check using the 1981 EVS data can be found in R. Lesthaeghe and D. Meekers, "Value changes and the dimensions of familism in the European Community", *European Journal of Population*, No. 2, 1986, pp. 225-268. The 1990 EVS data served again in R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, "Living arrangements, socio-economic position and values among young adults – a pattern description for France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands", in D. Coleman (ed.), *Europe's Population in the 1990s* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 163-221.

[14] A. Felling, J. Peters and O. Schreuder, *Burgerlijk en Onburgerlijk Nederland* (Deventer, Van Loghum-Slaterus, 1983) contains a thorough exploration of the connections between voting behaviour and value orientations for the late 1970s in the Netherlands. A similar analysis for Belgium including household positions as well is found in R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, "De gezinsrelaties: de ontwikkeling en stabilisatie van patronen", in J. Kerkhofs, K. Dobbelaere and L. Voyé (eds.), *De Versnelde Ommekeer* (Tielt, Uitgeverij Lannoo and King Baudouin Foundation, 1992), pp. 19-68.

[15] The most important United States panel studies with adequate measurements of values and attitudes are: the Detroit Intergenerational Panel Study of Parents and Children, the United States National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, the United States National Education Longitudinal Study, and the United States National Survey of Families and Households. Panel studies of similar questions came much later in Europe, and only two have adequate data for the present purposes: the Bielefeld Panel Study "Familienentwicklung in Nordrhein-Westfalen", and the Panel Study on Social Integration in the Netherlands.

whether or not specific values orientations had predictive power with respect to later household choices, and furthermore, they were able to assess to what extent earlier transitions in household position had led to the accentuation or the adjustment of previously held values and attitudes. In other words, a recursive model emerged with (i) *values-based selection* into alternative living arrangements; and (ii) *event-based values adaptation*. This feedback model of selection and adaptation provides the dynamics of the process, whereas the cross-sectional correlations between values and household positions are merely *footprints* of this recursive mechanism.[16]

As indicated above, the initial set of values that were thought to determine the selection among alternative pathways of household formation mainly dealt with the following dimensions in the west:

- *Secularisation*, or the reduction in religious practice, the abandonment of traditional religious beliefs (heaven, sin, …) and a decline in individual sentiments of religiosity (prayer, meditation, …);
- *The "new political left"*, with indicators pertaining to Inglehart's "postmaterialism", voting for Green parties or left-wing liberals, the propensity to protest, distrust in institutions, and anti-authoritarianism more generally;
- *Egalitarianism*, with an emphasis on gender equality, tolerance for minorities, rejection of social class distinctions, and a preoccupation with North-South equity associated with "world citizenship";
- *Unconventional civil morality and ethics*, with greater tolerance for forms of uncivil conduct (e.g. joyriding, drugs, tax evasion, …) as well as for interference in matters of life and death (euthanasia, abortion, suicide);
- *Accentuation of expressive values*, showing an enhanced preoccupation with individuality and self-fulfilment. Typical indicators are the ranking of the traits of "imagination" and "independence" above all other qualities in the education of children, or the preference for a job's intrinsic qualities (challenging, interesting, permitting social contact and initiative) rather than its material advantages (pay, vacations, promotion);
- *Companionship and unconventional marital ethics*, stressing the quality of a relationship (communication, tolerance and understanding, happy sexual relationship) over the conventional and institutional foundations of marriage and parenthood, and the toleration of deviations from strict marital morality (adultery, casual sex, …).

During the 1990s, aspects related to social cohesion and social capital were added to the list. There was a suspicion that traditional families had maintained stronger community ties and a higher degree of involvement in various types of local associations, whereas others had relinquished such links in favour of social networks based on personal friendships. These connections have not been adequately researched so far,[17] but in this article membership of associations and voluntary work are included as extra items.

At this point it should be stressed that values orientations are not the only influences that are important. Other factors matter and empirical research has found a role for:

Family antecedents: the experience of parental divorce, and/or of family reconstruction after a parental divorce, frequently lead to earlier home leaving, single living, premarital cohabitation and even lone parenthood;[18]

Regional historical contexts: in several European countries, cohabitation and procreation within cohabitation have increased much faster in regions (often rural ones) with a much longer history of tolerance for such forms of family formation (e.g. northern Scandinavia, Austrian alpine regions).[19] In

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[16] R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, "Life course transitions and value orientations: selection and adaptation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed.), *Meaning and Choice – Value Orientations and Life Course Decisions*, NIDI-CBGS Monograph No. 37, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (The Hague), 2002, chap. 1.

[17] The issues of social capital, membership of associations and social cohesion are mainly studied from a political science perspective, i.e. focusing on the role of such network memberships in fostering democratic values and in creating barriers to the extreme right. Association memberships and social networks are rarely related to household formation and life course transitions.

[18] There is a very extensive literature in both psychology and sociology on the effect of parental household dissolution, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries where these effects are enhanced, partly as a result of less adequate family support policies than in the rest of western Europe.

[19] J. Kytir, "Unehelich, Vorehelich, Ehelich: Familiengründung im Wandel", *Demografische Informationen 1992-93*, Institut für Demografie, Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vienna), 1993, pp. 29-40. For the levels of illegitimate fertility for all European provinces at the end of the nineteenth century, see A. Coale and R. Treadway, "A summary of the changing distribution of overall fertility, marital fertility and of proportions married in the provinces of Europe", in A. Coale and S. Cotts Watkins (eds.), *The*

other countries, the current emergence of new forms of household formation displays a strong correlation with the regional pattern of the "first demographic transition", i.e. with the onset of fertility control and the weakening of the late Malthusian marriage pattern during the nineteenth century (e.g. Belgium, France, Switzerland);[20]

Diffusion mechanisms: with the passing of time new forms of behaviour gain acceptability and legitimation, even to the point where they are accommodated by the legal system. Increased legitimation is both the motor and the outcome of social diffusion from an "innovative core" to other population segments;

Economic differentiation: new living arrangements may accommodate different economic aspirations and situations. For example, cohabitation may suit the motivation of women to maintain their economic independence, as postulated in neo-classical economic theory. Alternatively, it may be the expression of economic uncertainty, as proposed by Easterlin's relative deprivation theory.[21] In the former case, cohabitation is likely to be found among better-educated women with careers, whereas in the latter case cohabitation would be a dominant trait for lower social strata with less income security. Moreover, cohabitation may be an interim phase that is a correlate of the overall destandardisation of the life course, including the destandardisation of job and career paths.

Policy effects, labour market characteristics and housing conditions: earlier home leaving, single living and premarital cohabitation in the west are more typical of countries with income support policies for young adults in the form of scholarships, cheap student accommodation and transport subsidies.[22] Also the existence of flexible labour markets with an ample supply of part-time jobs contributes to earlier economic independence for younger adults. At the other end of the spectrum, prolonged residence in the parental home is more typical of countries without such policies and/or with expensive housing;[23]

To sum up, the shift towards "unconventional" values, often occurring via a succession of generations, is by no means the only factor that has shaped the "second demographic transition" in the west, but it has been a *non-redundant* factor in sustaining a long-term demographic trend through periods of slower and faster economic growth alike.

4 The footprints of selection and adaptation: what to expect?

In this section there is an analysis of the expected effects of values as they influence choice of path in family formation, and of the ways in which values are reinforced or adapted following such life course events. The overall picture of expectations is summarised in chart 4.1. First, on the vertical axis there is a variation between two poles. One pole brings together the values that are non-conformist and more libertarian. These are characterised by expressive values accentuating personality and self-actualisation in non-material domains, by the stress on individual autonomy with respect to all choices (morality and ethics included) and, correspondingly, by a rejection of institutional authority. This pole is also a secular one, with tolerance for all types of minorities, but also with a low identification or involvement in local community affairs. The opposite pole is obviously characterised by high conformity and respect for tradition, higher religiosity, respect for ethical and moral values that uphold social cohesion and respect for authority coupled with a greater trust in institutions.

The starting position in chart 4.1 is the respondent's residence in the parental household (Respar). At that point the "formative years", or the late adolescent period of values formation, are nearing their completion, and individuals have been subject to the influence of parents, schools and peers. The influence

Decline of Fertility in Europe (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 31-79. These figures illustrate that procreation within consensual unions was already widespread by 1900 in several areas of Austria, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Most of these areas were rural.

[20] R. Lesthaeghe and K. Neels, "From the first to the second demographic transition – an interpretation of the spatial continuity of demographic innovation in France, Belgium and Switzerland", *European Journal of Population*, 2002 (forthcoming).

[21] R. Easterlin, *Birth and Fortune* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987). See also R. Easterlin, "The conflict between aspirations and resources", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1976, pp. 417-425 and idem, "Relative economic status and the American fertility swing", in E. Sheldon (ed.), *Family Economic Behavior* (Philadelphia, Lippincot, 1973), pp. 170-223.

[22] OECD, *Preparing Youth for the 21st Century* (Paris, OECD Publications, 1999); R. Lesthaeghe, *Europe's Demographic Issues: Fertility, Household Formation and Replacement Migration,* United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Decline and Ageing (New York), 16-18 October 2000.

[23] T. Castro-Martin, "Delayed childbearing in contemporary Spain – trends and differentials", *European Journal of Population*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1992, pp. 217-246; P. Miret-Gamundi, "Nuptiality patterns in Spain in the eighties", *Genus*, Vol. 53, No. 3-4, 1997, pp. 185-200; G. Dalla Zuana, M. Atoh et al., "Late marriage among young people: the case of Italy and Japan", *Genus*, Vol. 53, No. 3-4, 1997, pp. 187-232.

Chart 4.1: Flow chart of life-course development and hypothesised changes in values orientations stemming from selection-adaptation mechanism



Respar = resident with parents ;
Single = never married and not in a union ;
Coh0 = cohabiting and no children ;
Mar0 = married and no children ;
Coh+ = cohabiting with children ;
Mar+E = married with children and ever cohabited ;
Mar+N = married with children and never cohabited ;
FmNu = formerly married or in union, not yet in new union.

of the latter is often in the opposite direction from that of the other two, and may rise over time.[24] Also, as already indicated, problems in the parental household (discord, separation, divorce) have a major influence on both children's values and options chosen in their life course. It may therefore be expected that the position of young adults is already shifting toward the non-conformist pole prior to leaving home.

During the next steps in the unfolding of the life course, it is expected that leaving home in favour of living alone is predicated on the dominance of the non-conformist set of values, whereas leaving home to get directly married reflects a choice based on conventional values.[25] At the same time, these two options reinforce the values that were responsible for the choice in the first place.[26] Hence, the position of "single" tends toward the non-conformist pole in chart 4.1, whereas "married without children" (Mar0) is toward the conformist end.

"Singles" face the option of moving into cohabitation (Coh0) or of marrying (Mar0). The former reinforces non-conformist values.[27] Partners are likely to be chosen for their preference for unconventional values that underpin the choice in favour of cohabitation. The mutually reinforcing orientations of such

[24] D. Alwin, "Historical changes in parental orientations to children", *Sociological Studies of Child Development*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 65-86.

[25] F. Kobrin-Goldscheider and C. Goldscheider, *Leaving Home before Marriage – Ethnicity, Familism and Generational Relationships* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); F. Kobrin-Goldscheider and L. Waite, "Nest-leaving patterns and the transition to marriage for young men and women", *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, Vol. 49, 1987, pp. 507-516; F. Kobrin-Goldscheider and J. Davanzo, "Semi-autonomy and leaving home in early adulthood", *Social Forces*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1986, pp. 187-201; E. Marchena and L. Waite, "Reassessing family goals and attitudes in late adolescence: the effects of natal family experiences and early family formation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed.), *Meaning and Choice …*, op. cit., chap. 3.

[26] A. Thornton, W. Axinn et al., "Reciprocal effects of religiosity, cohabitation and marriage", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98, No. 3, 1992, pp. 628-651; L. Waite and F. Kobrin-Goldscheider, "Non-family living and the erosion of traditional family orientations among young adults", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 541-554; G. Moors, "Values and living arrangements: a recursive relationship", in L. Waite et al. (eds.), *Ties that Bind: Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation* (Hawthorne, Aldine de Gruyter Publishers, 2001), chap. 11.

[27] J. Barber, W. Axinn and A. Thornton, "The influence of attitudes on family formation processes", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed.), *Meaning and Choice …*, op. cit., chap. 2; M. Jansen and M. Kalmijn, "Investment in family life – the impact of value orientations on patterns of consumption, production and reproduction in married and cohabiting couples", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed.), *Meaning and Choice …*, op. cit., chap. 4.

partners may then enhance the consistency of various values sets more generally, so that childless cohabitants (Coh0) can be expected to score *highest* and most *consistently* on the value orientations associated with pole 1. By contrast, singles who move into marriage may do so because of a higher respect for traditional institutions, out of respect for parental preferences, or because they choose a partner with more conventional attitudes. Once the institution of marriage is accepted, the consistency of values is again reinforced, and a move in the opposite direction, i.e. towards pole 2, can be expected. A similar process would apply to cohabitants who marry prior to parenthood. For them, the reorientation of values associated with a transition to marriage could be quite substantial given that they come from a strongly non-conventional position. However, it is possible that the earlier convictions are not obliterated altogether, and that the *experience of cohabitation leaves a durable imprint*.

The adjustment effects of parenthood are expected to be even stronger than those of marriage. In fact, values shifts in the conformist direction already occur in anticipation of parenthood,[28] the transition from cohabitation to marriage often being made in anticipation of the arrival of the first child. Parenthood corresponds with a firm commitment to both partner and child, closes "open futures", and redirects attention to the well-being of the next generation. Moral, civil and ethical values are reaffirmed, and social networks associated with children are activated. Tolerance for deviance diminishes, authority regains prominence, and self-actualisation takes second place. Priorities are centred on the "priceless child", and preoccupations shift in favour of those upholding greater social cohesion. In chart 4.1, all positions with children are therefore located further toward the conformist pole. Nevertheless, it is hypothesised that the earlier experience of cohabitation acts as a brake on this readjustment. The position of Mar+E (= ever cohabited) therefore remains above that of Mar+N (= never cohabited) on chart 4.1.

Finally, a separation or divorce which has not yet been followed by a new partnership (FmNu) causes a complete overhaul of the values structure. New doubts emerge with respect to religion, traditional family values and trust in institutions. The individual is also more likely to become more self-focused, and hence there is a new preoccupation with the expressive values and with individual autonomy. It is therefore hypothesised that the FmNu position shifts toward the non-conformist pole.

The household positions in chart 4.1 are incomplete, and so are the types of transition. However, they capture the dominant streams through the life course. Moreover, the EVS only captures sections of the life course, and the sample sizes are too small to separate certain categories into more meaningful ones. For instance, the category Mar0, i.e. married without children, is too small to disaggregate into those who "ever" and "never cohabited". This highlights once more the need for larger samples, and it shows the usefulness of "ever" questions probing for the occurrence of earlier events or life markers.

The overall outcome of this section is that there should be an ordering of individual household positions along the vertical axis of chart 4.1, i.e. roughly from "traditional" to "non-conformist". In this ordering, cohabitants without children should score highest on non-conformism, followed by singles and formerly married. Residents in parental households should come next. More towards the opposite pole are married persons without children, cohabiting parents and married parents who had previously cohabited. The most conservative values should be found among married parents who never cohabited. It should also be noted that these expectations about the "footprints" of the recursive life cycle model were formulated *in tempore non suspecto*, i.e. well before the present EVS survey results were available.[29]

5 Measurement and profiles: do we find the footprints of selection and adaptation?

In this section the use of 80 specified values is proposed, and these are analysed for respondents aged 18 to 45. The selected values were common to all the country-specific questionnaires of the 1999 EVS. The item profiles according to the household position of respondents are checked to see whether the expectations just formulated are emerging in all three pooled country data sets. Similarity would indicate that the selection and adjustment mechanisms that connect value orientations and life course choices are indeed still operating more or less universally. On the other hand comparison between the northern, southern and western European cases, which started their transitions at very different points in time, may

[28] G. Moors, "Reciprocal relations between gender role values and family formation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed.), *Meaning and Choice ...*, op. cit., chap. 7; M. Jansen and M. Kalmijn, "Emancipatiewaarden en de Levensloop van Jong-volwassen Vrouwen", *Sociologische Gids*, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2000, pp. 293-314.

[29] The "selection-adaptation" hypothesis was also the starting point of a symposium held in October 2000 at the Belgian Academy of Sciences. The participants were all authors who had documented these recursive effects in their work with panel data. A translation of such effects into cross-sectional profiles is given in R. Lesthaeghe, J. Surkyn and J. Anson, "Household positions and value orientations – an exploration with Belgian and German EVS data", paper presented at the Euresco Conference on The Second Demographic Transition (Bad Herrenalb), 23-28 June 2001, session 4B.

shed light on the staging of the process. Looking at the second demographic transition as a diffusion process, it will be interesting to see whether the Scandinavian countries, that occupied an advanced position in the transition process, still exhibit the same value profiles in relationship to household positions as the Iberian countries.

Firstly, the selection of 80 items was made on the basis of the individual country data sets. In this exploratory analysis use was made of Multiple Classification Analyses (MCA) of over 150 items. For each item the covariates were a household position and country-group combination variable (8 x 3 = 24 categories), age and age squared (continuous), education level (4 categories), profession (9 categories, including "unemployed", "housewives" and "students"), gender, and urbanisation (2 categories). The selection of the final 80 items was based on: (i) *the topic*, i.e. making sure that the items covered all major domains or subjects, and (ii) the *strength of their association* with household positions, i.e. the least discriminating items were left out.[30] A set of 80 items is still very large, but maintaining multiple items per subject increases measurement validity. The 80 items are listed in table 5.1. *All* items are coded as dummy variables, with the value of unity always being assigned to the non-conformist or unconventional opinion. Such a *uniform coding direction* facilitates the subsequent inspection of value profiles across covariates and countries.

The list in table 5.1 contains nine major subjects. The largest number of items (15) pertains to attitudes related to marriage as an institution, to the qualities needed for the success of a marriage, to the meaning of parenthood and parent-child duties, and to the degree of permissiveness with respect to sexual freedom, divorce and abortion. Secularism is represented by 9 items indicating a loss of traditional religious beliefs, a low level of individual religious sentiment, and distrust in the churches as institutions. The civil morality set with 12 items captures permissiveness with respect to different forms of deviant behaviour, but also the ethical acceptability of forms of interference in matters of life and death. The political set contains 11 items dealing with distrust of institutions, protest proneness, Inglehart's post-materialism index and the rejection of authority more generally. The social distance or tolerance set is made up of 8 items that indicate the type of persons that are either tolerated as neighbours or considered as undesirable. The expressive values are spread over the socialisation and work qualities sets. The former (7 items) show the preference for developing imagination and independence in education rather than conformity and respect for others. The latter (8 items) indicate a similar preference for intrinsic work qualities over material rewards or status. The identification set (6 items) distinguishes a global or larger orientation rather than a local identification or national pride, but with distrust in established international organisations. The last set of 4 items indicates a retreat from social and political life, and reveals the absence of any memberships or voluntary work, a distrust of people in general and a lack of any interest in politics. In all further analyses these 80 values will be used *without* any prior data reduction, such as factor analysis. Hence, *no particular structure will be imposed* prior to further statistical work.

At this point the value profiles according to household position can be established. It will be recalled that (i) all items are coded in the unconventional or non-conformist direction; and (ii) that controls are present for other covariates (i.e. gender, age, education, profession and urbanity). The data set now takes the form of *net* deviations from the item mean associated with each of the eight household positions over three country groups. Such net deviations are available for each of the 80 items. A positive value of a net deviation from the item mean indicates that a particular household position has a more non-conformist attitude than average for the item concerned. Hence, a simple tally of the number of positive deviations for each household position is already highly revealing of the overall profile.

The results of such a tally are displayed in table 5.2 and chart 5.1 for each of the three groups of countries. The Multiple Classification Analyses that produced these results were performed for each country group separately, so that individuals in a particular household position are being compared to all others *within* the same group of countries, and for all 80 items. With the "neutral line" set at 40 net positive deviations out of the possible 80, young Scandinavian residents in the parental household (Respar), for instance, score remarkably low on non-conformism (only 29 net positive deviations from the means of 80 items, or a deficit of 29 – 40 = -11) when compared to Scandinavians in the other household positions. Such a profile is not found in Iberia-2 or West-3: residents in the parental household in these regions already exhibit a high non-conformist score (52 and 63 respectively) when compared to the others in the same country group. This could mean that those in the "Respar" category in Scandinavia are

[30] The excluded items were related to the "left-right" dimension in economic and social policies (state and labour union interference versus free enterprise) and economic equity, perceived causes of poverty, overall job satisfaction, political items covering the functioning of democracy, and more detailed attitudes towards elderly people and immigrants. Several items pertaining to female autonomy and gender inequality also had to be excluded since they were not incorporated in all the national questionnaires.

Table 5.1: European Values Surveys, 1999: overview of 80 values used in the current analysis

Topics and corresponding items	*Item description*
Marriage and family: A1-A15	Marriage is an outdated institution (A1); children not necessary for life fulfilment (A2); parents should not sacrifice themselves for children (A3); acceptable: casual sex (A4), adultery (A5), divorce (A6), abortion (A7); important for marriage: tolerance and understanding (A8), sharing chores (A9), talking (A10), time together (A11), happy sexual relations (A12); not very important for the success of marriage: faithfulness (A13), children (A14); single motherhood acceptable (A15).
Religion: A16-A24	Not believing in: god (A16), sin (A17), hell (A18), heaven (A19); no comfort from religion (A20); no moments of prayer or meditation (A21); god not at all important in life (A22); distrust church (A23); religious faith not mentioned as socialisation trait (A24).
Civil morality: A25-A36	Acceptable: soft drugs (A25), homosexuality (A26), joyriding (A27), suicide (A28), euthanasia (A29), speeding (A30), drunk driving (A31), accepting bribes (A32), tax cheating (A33), lying (A34), tax evasion by paying cash (A35), claiming unentitled state benefits (A36).
Politics: B1-B11	Distrust in institutions: education system (B1), army (B2), police (B3), justice system (B4), civil service (B5); participated or willing to participate in: unofficial strikes (B6), attend unlawful demonstrations (B7), join boycotts (B8), occupy buildings (B9); no more respect for authority (B10); post-materialist (B11).
Identification: B12-B17	Identification with "Europe and world" (B12), not with "own village or town" (B13), not very or quite proud of own nationality (B14); no priority for national workers (B15); no trust in European Union (B16) or United Nations (B17).
Retreat: B18-B21	Not a member of any voluntary organisation (B18); no voluntary work (B19); people cannot be trusted (B20); never discuss politics (B21).
Socialisation: C1-C7	Not mentioned as desirable traits in educating children: hard work (C1), obedience (C2), good manners (C3), unselfishness (C4), tolerance and respect (C5); stressed as desirable: independence (C6), imagination (C7).
Work qualities: C8-C15	Not mentioned as desirable job aspects: good hours (C8), promotion (C9); stressed as desirable: respected job (C10), responsible job (C11), meeting people (C12), useful for society (C13), interesting work (C14), enabling initiative (C15).
Social distance: C16-C23	Not wanted as neighbours: large families (C16), right-wing people (C17); no objection to having as neighbours: aids patients (C18), unstable people (C19), those with criminal record (C20), drug addicts (C21), homosexuals (C22), immigrants (C23).

Note: All items are presented from a "non-conformist" perspective.

disproportionately made up of late home leavers selected for greater conformity. However, as oneprogresses to those living alone (Single) and further to childless cohabitants (Coh0), the differences between the three regions first shrink and then disappear altogether. As predicted in section 4, childless cohabitants score consistently highest on non-conformism of all household positions considered, and this holds again in all three regions studied here. Hence, even in Sweden and Denmark in 1999, the classic non-conformist profile for childless cohabitants is just as clear a mark of distinction as in the other regions, despite the very early onset of the SDT in these countries, and despite their routinisation of single living and cohabitation as well.

The rest of the findings plotted in chart 5.1 are equally in line with the "footprints" predictions of section 4. Moves into marriage and/or into parenthood are all associated with values readjustments and with reduced non-conformism. In all three regions, cohabitants with children (Coh+) still have tallies above 40 net positive deviations (Iberia-2: 45; Scandinavia-2: 49; West-3: 47), but these scores are already well below those for childless cohabitants (63 or 64). This is suggestive of the fact that parenthood without prior marriage *in all three regions* is still based on a selection for higher non-conformism in a wide array of values orientations, but that parenthood itself brings a readjustment of these values in the opposite direction for persistent cohabitants as well.

A move into marriage prior to parenthood (Mar0), irrespective of the previous household position, is equally associated in all three regions with lower scores on non-conformism. However, this is most pronounced for West-3 and least for Scandinavia-2. In fact, the Swedish and Danish married couples without children still have a slight excess on net positive deviations (44 or +4), whereas in the other country groups, childless married persons have a clear deficit (-5 in Iberia-2 and already –11 in West-3).

Again in line with the "footprints" prediction is that the lowest scores of overall non-conformity are found for the currently married respondents with children and who *never* cohabited (Mar+N). The differences for this category between the three regions are not large, and in this respect the Scandinavian profile is again not noticeably different from the western European or the Iberian ones.

Chart 5.1: Number of positive net deviations (= non-conformist) for 80 items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for three groups of European countries after controls for other covariates.



Table 5.2: Number of positive net deviations (= in non-conformist direction) for 80 value items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for three groups of European countries after controls for other covariates.

	Household position							
	Respar	Single	Coh0	Coh+	Mar0	Mar+N	Mar+E	FmNu
Scandinavia-2	29	44	63	49	44	22	35	34
West-3	63	61	63	47	29	14	29	57
Iberia-2	52	54	64	45	35	16	29	46

Note: the net deviations from the 80 item means are produced by MCAs performed for each country group separately and controlling for gender, age, age squared, education, profession and urbanity. The maximum overall non-conformist score is 80.

Equally predicted in section 4 was that the earlier experience of cohabitation would have a more lasting impact. This can be checked here by comparing the results for currently married respondents with children who *ever* cohabited and who *never* cohabited respectively (Mar+E versus Mar+N). In the 1999 EVS and in all three regions, married parents who did cohabit before have indeed a higher overall non-conformism tally than those who did not cohabit. The gap is not small either, and reaches 13 to 15 net positive deviations more for the ever-cohabiting groups in the three regions.

Finally, the predicted upsurge of non-conformism associated with divorce or partner separation is found in the 1999 EVS, but only for West-3 and Iberia-2. This effect is much weaker in the two Scandinavian countries, and the FmNu group maintains a fairly average position in this region. Only for this particular group would the routinisation argument hold : higher divorce rates for a much longer time in

Scandinavian countries would lead to less values-based selectivity and weaker values readjustment following a partner separation.

To sum up, the 1999 EVS results reaffirm that there is a persistent statistical association between current household position and earlier cohabitation on the one hand and non-conformism with respect to a wide array of values orientations on the other hand. We also found very similar values profiles according to household position on the basis of the 1999 EVS data for a set of Central and Eastern European countries. Obviously, the magnitudes of the selection effects and of the adjustment effects vary between European regions and societies, but the "footprints" outcomes are nevertheless strikingly similar. In the comparison presented here, including the precursor countries in the SDT (Sweden, Denmark) and newcomers (Spain, Portugal), there are no fundamental distinctions : childless cohabitants stand out as the most non-conformist in all three regions, moves into marriage and parenthood are typically associated with values readjustments in the conformist direction, and the earlier cohabitation experience has again a lasting impact even when all have moved into marriage and parenthood. The pooled Scandinavian group only distinguishes itself from the others on the basis of very low non-conformism for residents in the parental home ("left over" effect ?) and no major upsurge in non-conformism for the newly separated or divorced (routinisation effect ?).

6 Finer distinctions

So far the analysis has relied on simple tallies of net positive deviations generated by Multiple Classification Analyses (MCA). In what follows, the item-by-item analysis is extended by using the net positive deviations as inputs into a Correspondence Analysis.[31] The aim is to bring out the *proximities* of value items and household positions by trying to project them on a plane. Since proximities rely on distances, which obviously cannot be negative, the net deviations generated by the MCA are converted into rankings.[32] Hence, the input is now the ranking of a household position (from 1 to 8) within each country group on each of the 80 items, a rank of 1 indicating that a particular household position has the highest positive net deviation for a particular item in the country group. It is recalled that the net deviations, and hence also the rankings, are measured *after* controls for gender, age, education, profession and urbanisation.

With 80 items and 3 x 8 household positions, the projection of proximities yields a plot with 104 dots. Since all of these would need to be identified with labels, such "busy" plots are not easy to read. To overcome this drawback, new figures were prepared using the following procedure:

- The 3 x 8 household positions are plotted on their exact location in the plane and are labeled, but the items remain in the chart as unlabeled dots, grouped according to their own proximities. The group is then represented by a segment of the plane spreading outwards from the origin;
- It turned out that 6 groups of items, and hence 6 segments, could give an adequate description of the item plots;
- It is helpful to add the information from the previous section, and to indicate to what extent each household position contributes to the overall non-conformity score from 0 to 80. We have therefore tilted the projection plane, so that a third dimension can be used to indicate the overall non-conformity score of each household position;
- The tilted projection plane is located at a non-conformity level of 40. The vertical arrows for each household position then indicate the number of items in the non-conventional direction above (red arrows) or below (blue arrows) the neutral mark of 40 for that household position.

The resulting three-dimensional figures now contain a large amount of information. If a household type has an overall non-conformity score well in excess of 40 and is found near the edge of the plane, then it draws disproportionately on those non-conformity items that are located in its own segment. In other words, these are the items for which the household position has produced the higher rankings with respect to the net deviations. Conversely, if the household type has a low overall non-conformity score well below 40, it would still have higher rankings on nearby items in its own segment. Household positions that are

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[31] For the philosophy and technical details, see J.-P. Benzecri, *L'analyse des données – L'analyse des correspondences* (Paris, Dunod, 1973) and M. Greenacre, *Theory and Applications of Correspondence Analysis* (London, Academic Press, 1984). In the current application, the SAS software was used. See SAS Institute Inc., *Statistics and Graphics Guide*, Version 3.1 JMP (Cary, NC), 1995, pp. 105-111.

[32] We owe this useful methodological suggestion to J. Anson, who also put us on the path of correspondence analysis as a powerful tool for visualising the proximities between household positions and value items.

located closely to the origin have higher rankings for all items, and not mainly for a particular group identified by a segment of the projection plane. When this is coupled with a high overall non-conformity score, this indicates that the household position produced high rankings for a great variety of items, and if such a position near the origin is coupled with a low overall score, then it draws its small set of the higher rankings from all sorts of items as well. Finally, household types that are located at the opposite end of certain segments draw nothing or almost nothing from the items associated with these segments[33].

We shall now turn to the results of the Correspondence Analyses. Firstly, this technique produces a unique plot of the 80 value-items for the three regions combined. In this way, the region-specific properties with respect to the preferences of the various household types can be compared in a later section. The value-items themselves are obviously not scattered randomly on the projection plane, but clustered according to their proximities to household types, and hence to some degree grouped according to common topic or meaning. Figure 6.1 provides a representation of the location of the various "clusters" of value items together with labels and the borders of the six segments (see also below). As already indicated, we have identified six segments in charts 6.1 through 6.4. Obviously, we could have shifted the boundaries of the segments or altered their number, and evidently, the present solution is largely arbitrary. However, as also shown in table 6.1, this solution has some direct meaning when judged on the basis of the specific clustering of items. At any rate, this segmentation is not a goal in its own right (as the identification of orthogonal factors would be in factor analysis, for instance), but mainly a device that will facilitate the main task, i.e. the country groups comparison of household "preferences" concerning these 80 value-items.

A brief discussion of the content of the six segments may now be helpful, and Table 6.1 has been set up for this purpose. The codes obviously refer to the item codes introduced in Table 5.1.

- *Segment I* contains a dominant set of items that are indicative of *"core" secularisation or atheism*. These items are the expression of the rejection of basic elements of religion, such as the belief in God and sin, or the importance of God in life. The items also point at the absence of religious sentiments (A16, A17, A20, A22). To this, a second set can be added with items that are related to *protest-proneness and activism* (B3, B6, B9). Segment I also contains more isolated items that often belong to a cluster located in an adjacent segment, such as the items pertaining to a weaker family orientation (A3, A6), more libertarian civil morality (A26, A27), or a more cosmopolitan outlook (B12, B14).
- *Segment II* contains especially items of *non-conformism in matters related to marriage and the family* (A1, A4, A5, A7, A13, A15). There is also a rejection of more "marginal" aspects of religion (e.g. belief in heaven and hell) (A18, A19) and distrust in the church as an institution (A23).
- *Segment III* is more heterogeneous and contains groups of items dealing with more "*youthful" forms of libertarian civil morality and distrust in institutions* (A25, A28, A31, B1, B5, B17). This is linked to a *lack of interest in children* (A14, C16). Also indicators of *low social involvement* (B19, B21) belong to segment III.
- *Segment IV* corresponds to a very pronounced orientation toward the *expressive work values*, and hence to *self-actualisation* in the work sphere (C8, C9, C13, C14, C15). This is matched by a high *tolerance* for deviant groups or minorities (C21, C22, C23). More isolated items in segment IV deal with weaker civil morality, low community involvement or lack of national pride (A30, A32, B18, B13).
- *Segment V* mainly contains items stressing *companionship* in marriage (A10, A11) and *social status* aspects of work (C10, C11). But this is accompanied by a higher degree of *distrust in other people* in general and in the justice system (B2, B4, B20)

[33] One could read the information on charts 6 in the following intuitive manner. Imagine a large round table with a varied and rich buffet dinner, displaying 80 food items or dishes. These items are arranged in segments on the table, very much according to their similarity, so that one has segments for cheeses, meats, fish, salads, fruits, etc. We are interested in checking the preferences of various groups of individuals (here sorted according to household type, and matched for several other characteristics). A "greedy and omnivorous" group would pick a lot from the table and from all types of food. The result would be a high score (well above 40 items) and a location near the origin of the plot, given that there are no clear preferences or aversions. By contrast, an "abstemious and selective" group would pick little and only from a particular segment. Their overall score would be lower than 40 and this group would be located in a particular segment, e.g. fruits & salads, and away from the origin given their aversion to meats, cheeses and fish. In charts 6 we inspect the choices (types of items) and the overall score (relative to 40 items) for 8 groups (household types) in 3 sets of countries, i.e. for 24 groups in total. The buffet dinner is displayed in an identical fashion for all 24 groups.

Chart 6.1.: Location of major “clusters” of non-conformist value items on the Correspondence Analysis projection plane



Chart 6.2.: Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist value items, EVS 1999, results for Scandinavia-2 (pooled samples)



I: Atheist and secular, activist
II: Non-conformist re marriage and family
III: More "youthful" deviations re civil morality and distrust in institutions, lack of child orientation, low social involvement
IV: Self-actualisation through expressive work values, tolerant toward ethnic minorities or deviant groups
V: Oriented toward companionship and social status, distrusting social environment
VI: Egalitarian and anti-authoritarian, “post-materialist", stressing expressive socialisation, “adult” forms of civil morality deviations acceptable

Chart 6.3.: Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist value items, EVS 1999, results for West-3 (pooled samples)



Chart 6.4.: Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist value items, EVS 1999, results for Iberia-2 (pooled samples)



I: Atheist and secular, activist
II: Non-conformist re marriage and family
III: More "youthful" deviations re civil morality and distrust in institutions, lack of child orientation, low social involvement
IV: Self-actualisation through expressive work values, tolerant toward ethnic minorities or deviant groups
V: Oriented toward companionship and social status, distrusting social environment
VI: Egalitarian and anti-authoritarian, "post-materialist", stressing expressive socialisation, "adult" forms of civil morality deviations acceptable

Table 6.1: Location of 80 value items in the six segments of charts 6.1. through 6.4.

	Corresponding value items
Segment I	**A3, A6, A16, A17, A20, A22, A26, A27,**
	B3, B6, B9, B12, B14 (13 items)
Segment II	**A1, A4, A5, A7, A13, A15, A18, A19, A23 (9 items)**
Segment III	**A14, A25, A28 , A31,**
	B1, B5, B17, B19, B21,
	C3, C16, C18 (12 items)
Segment IV	**A30, A32,**
	B13, B18,
	C5, C8, C9, C13, C14, C15, C21, C22, C23 (13 items)
Segment V	**A10, A11, A34,**
	B2, B4, B20,
	C1, C10, C11, C17 (10 items)
Segment VI	**A2, A8, A9, A12, A21, A24, A29, A33, A35, A36,**
	B7, B8, B10, B11, B15, B16,
	C2, C4, C6, C7, C12, C19, C20 (23 items)

Note: The codes above are those of Table 5.1.

- *Segment VI* contains the largest number of items, and these essentially belong to four subcategories. Firstly, there are several items indicative of a preference for a more *egalitarian partnership* (important: tolerance and understanding, sharing chores, happy sexual relationship – A2, A8, A9, A12). Secondly, there is a large cluster of items related to *post-materialism and an anti-authoritarian outlook in general* (B7, B8, B10, B11, C2). Thirdly, this orientation is equally emerging in the accentuation of the expressive socialisation values of "independence and imagination" (C6, C7) and in the rejection of typically conformist ones (C2, C4). Fourthly, there is also a set of items indicative of a greater acceptability of more "adult" forms of civil morality deviance, such as tax evasion, tax cheating and social security fraud (B7, B8, B10, B11). However, this set of items is located closer to the origin, and is therefore more common to all respondents. Finally, segment VI also contains a few borderline items that are typical of the adjacent segments: they are related to secularism (A21, A24) and tolerance for deviant groups (C19, C20). With the exception of the civil morality set, many items in segment VI are related to a preference for equity in social relations and an aversion for authority.

We shall now turn to the more detailed comparison of the outcomes for the three groups of countries. These results are shown in charts 6.2 through 6.4, respectively for Scandinavia-2, West-3 and Iberia-2. The main differences between these regions can be summarised as follows:

1. *Respar.* We have already stressed that the respondents residing in the parental home in Sweden and Denmark stand out by their overall low non-conformity score when compared to their counterparts in the other two regions (cf. the "left over" hypothesis). Chart 6.2 now indicates that the fewer non-conformist items in the Scandinavian group belong to segment II, i.e. to non-conformist attitudes with respect to marriage and the family. Residents in the parental household in the other two regions have much higher overall non-conformist scores, and these Respar-groups are located much more closely to the origin as a consequence. Compared to their Scandinavian counterparts, they have a stronger preference for the items in segments I and VI. In other words, residents in parental households in the western European and Iberian countries are much more secularised and more oriented to egalitarian and anti-authoritarian values orientations.
2. *Single.* In all three regions respondents living alone show a relative surplus on the overall non-conformist scale (red upwardly pointing arrows). They have a preference for the value-items in segment II in West-3 and Iberia-2, and for those in adjacent segment III in Scandinavia-2. It comes as no surprise that singles are non-conformist re marriage and family, have no interest in children,

have secular ethics, or entertain the more "youthful" forms of weaker civil morality and distrust in institutions. More surprising is that Scandinavian singles score so low on social involvement (i.e. never discuss politics, no voluntary work).

3. *Coh0.* From the previous section we also know that childless cohabitants systematically have the highest overall non-conformist score of all household positions, and that this holds in all groups of countries. The Scandinavian Coh0-group is again slightly different from their counterparts in the other two regions. The former has a more distinct preference for the items in segment II (non-conformist re marriage and family), whereas the latter have a profile that favours the items of segment I (atheist or non-religious, social activist).

4. *Coh+.* Cohabitants with children still have a relative surplus (red arrows) on the non-conformist tally in the three regions, but the regional profiles are more distinct. In the Scandinavian countries, cohabitants who have progressed to parenthood are located closer to the items of segment VI, and stress egalitarian partnership in tandem with being "post-materialist". They strongly endorse expressive socialisation traits, and tolerance for minorities or for groups with deviant behaviours. The Iberian cohabiting parents – who are of course less common – have profiles that are diametrically at the opposite side of the projection circle. They have a stronger preference for the items in segment III, i.e. for the more "youthful" forms of distrust in institutions and deviations re civil morality. The profile for West-3 is again distinct from the others, and shows a preference for items in segment II. In other words, the Coh+ group in the three western European countries seem to maintain their initial non-conformist characteristics that are associated with selection into cohabitation in the first place (i.e. non-conformist re marriage and family). Moreover, in West-3 the positions of Respar, Single, Coh0 and Coh+ are all located very closely together on the projection plane in chart 6.2, meaning that they have very similar values preferences (those of segments I and II). In Iberia-2, this also holds for the first three household types, but not for Coh+ which is clearly located in segment III. In the Scandinavian countries the values profiles of these four household positions are more strongly differentiated and spread over segments II, III and VI. Scandinavian cohabiting parents are furthermore much more comparable in their value orientations to married individuals than in all the other countries.

5. *Mar0.* Childless married persons in the two Scandinavian countries are again somewhat different in their values preferences compared to their counterparts of West-3 and Iberia-2. Firstly, the Scandinavians still have a relative surplus on the overall non-conformist tally, and secondly they are firmly located in segment VI (egalitarian partnership, anti-authoritarian, expressive socialisation). In the other regions a different selection process seems to be operating: the Mar0 category has a much more conformist outlook (cf. the relative deficit on the overall non-conformist scale) and this group mainly subscribes to a different package of non-conformist items as well. More specifically, the smaller number of non-conformist items for Mar0 is located disproportionately in segment IV, which mainly corresponds to self-actualisation via stressing the expressive work qualities.

6. *Mar+N.* As indicated in the previous section, married parents who never cohabited before are by all means the most conformist group. They have by far the largest relative deficit of non-conformist items in all three groups of countries (largest downward pointing blue arrows in charts 6.2 through 6.4). Their values profiles are not very dissimilar either in the three regions. The small set of non-conformist items acceptable to never cohabiting married parents belong to segments IV or V: expressive work values, work with prestige and responsibility, and stress on companionship in marriage. There is an aversion to the items of segments I and II, which are at the opposite end of the projection plane.

7. *Mar+E.* We have also pointed out in the previous section that married parents with an earlier cohabitation experience (i.e. *ever* cohabited) have retained a more overall non-conformist outlook than those without such an experience (i.e. Mar+N). In terms of the more specific value profiles, the difference between these two groups is small in the two Scandinavian countries (see chart 6.2), probably because of the routinisation of cohabitation. In these countries both groups of married parents are also located in segment V. In West-3 and Iberia-2, however, these two household types are much further apart (see chart 6.2 and especially chart 6.3): the Mar+E group is always much closer to segment VI with its large clusters of items related to anti-authoritarianism and equality. In other words, in the western European and Iberian countries, the earlier experience of cohabitation not only leads to less conservatism and less conformist in general, but particularly to a lasting aversion for inequality and authority as well. Expressed in more classic political science

terminology, the Mar+E group has retained more "new left" and more "post-materialist" traits in western Europe and Iberia.

8. *FmNu.* As expected, the group of respondents who are currently divorced or separated, but who are not yet in a new union, have a return of their value profiles in the direction of segment VI and away from segments IV and V (typically for the married persons). In other words, they return to stressing egalitarian and anti-authoritarian values. In the Scandinavian countries, they do so to a remarkable degree and this is coupled to more secularisation as well (see the proximity of segment I). However, the other aspects of non-conformity are stressed less by the Swedish and Danish respondents. The western European and the Iberian FmNu categories again resemble all those who are not yet married, and they return to much higher overall, but less differentiated, non-conformist scores.

On the whole, the inspection of the more detailed value profiles of the various household types in the three groups of countries reveals a strong similarity between West-3 and Iberia-2. It seems that the Spanish and Portuguese are largely following similar selection and adjustment paths during the SDT as the Belgians, French or Germans. The Danish and Swedish profiles are more idiosyncratic in their details. For instance, the effect of the secularisation factor in the pooled Scandinavian sample is less important than in the other two regional groups. We hypothesise that such regional differences in the more precise nature of the "footprints" could be due, at least in part, to historical features of cultural and social organisation, to timing differences in the onset of the SDT, and to large differences in the incidence of the "new" household types. Each of these factors could produce different selection and adjustment outcomes (cf. the presumed "left behind" effect for the smaller Scandinavian Respar-group, or the greater similarity between the Scandinavian Mar+N and Mar+E groups). However, such finer explanatory hypotheses can definitely never be tested with cross-sectional data of the sort used here, and for the time being the causes of these more idiosyncratic profiles of the Scandinavia-2 set will remain a matter of speculation.

7. Conclusions

The new types of household formation via more prolonged single living, premarital cohabitation, and progression to parenthood within cohabiting unions have steadily gained ground in Europe. These features of the SDT initially appeared in Scandinavia during the 1960s, spread to western Europe in the 1970s, reached the Iberian populations in the mid-1980s, and apparently expanded to central Europe as well during the 1990s. For all regions listed above, we found a clear statistical association between a variety of values orientations and household types, and this association persists after controls for age, gender, education, profession and urbanity. The patterning of the values profiles according to household types is quite similar in the various regions of Europe. To bring this out more clearly, we have added the profiles of a group of central and a group of eastern European countries to those of the three regions used here. This overall picture is shown in chart 7.1. From this enlarged set of values profiles we can draw a number of conclusions.

1. There is a set of features that is present in all country groups studied so far. Firstly, childless cohabitants typically have the most pronounced non-conformist orientation in the various values sets pertaining to secularisation, ethics, civil morality, egalitarianism, anti-authoritarianism, expressive values in work and socialisation, tolerance, world orientation etc. Secondly, married parents who never cohabited are always at the other end of the spectrum with the lowest non-conformist score of all. Thirdly, married parents who ever cohabited are always more non-conformist than their counterparts who never cohabited. This suggests that the earlier cohabitation experience has a lasting effect operating in the non-conformist direction.
2. There are also several features which are not found in all regions, but that are still very common. For instance, single living is also associated with very high non-conformist across a wide variety of dimensions. And also, when compared to married persons, divorcees and separated individuals who are not yet in a new union seem to return to distinctly more non-conformist values.

Chart 7.1: Number of positive net deviations (=in non-conformist direction) for 80 items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for five groups of European countries after controls for other covariates.



Note: Central-7 consists of the unweighted pooled EVS-samples of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; East-5 of those of Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The dynamics of the process that produces these differentials by household type can obviously not be detected through a simple cross-sectional data set of the type used here. The main advantage of the EVS is solely that this survey allows for the study of such differentials for a large set of value items. If we want to study the dynamics themselves, we have to turn to longitudinal studies, and there is a small collection of US and western European panel studies that have been of considerable help in shedding light on what is happening. However, each of these panel-based analyses only deals with either one or two very specific transitions and only focuses on a limited number of value items. Nevertheless, two mechanisms emerge. Firstly, there is the self-selection of individuals into particular household positions depending on, *inter alia*, the value orientations that were held prior to the transition. This is the feature of values-based selection and sorting. Secondly, there is the adjustment or reinforcement of existing values depending on the particular type of household transition that has just been made. This is the feature of the transition-based values adaptation. Together these two features constitute the recursive model of selection and adaptation, and this model, although operating over time, must result at one particular moment in a specific cross-sectional profile of values for the various household types (see section 4). These values profiles by household type are referred to as the "footprints" of the selection-adaptation model.

The main conclusion of our investigation is that these "footprints" are found in all the regions studied so far, and hence in the SDT-precursors as well as in the SDT-newcomers. There are, however, complications that cause regional differences in the more precise values profiles by household type. These stem from different historical developments re culture and social organisation, the differences in the onset and staging of the SDT, the differences in the dominant types of household transitions, and from differences in the timing and speed of these transitions. The detection of the nature and the causes of these differences is again far beyond the capacity of the present analysis with cross-sectional data. Yet, despite such distortions, the present descriptive results on overall non-conformist for the various regions are remarkably similar and robust, and they lend further credence to the involvement of major ideational effects in the unfolding of the SDT.